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This essay will develop a form of nonnatural realism about value, arrived at 
by way of reflection on the so-called “supervenience objection” to the 
view. Though I will argue the objection fails as an objection, I think it is a 
first-rate challenge; one that forces us to come back with a clearer and 
hopefully better statement of our position. 
The supervenience objection has been discussed and developed so widely 
that it is probably quixotic to try to give a statement that will satisfy every-
one. One reason to hope many will find their favourite version addressed is 
that I take up, not one, but two objections. The bulk of the paper responds 
to Simon Blackburn’s (1971, 1985) challenge, which is to explain why it is 
analytic that normative properties supervene on descriptive properties. In 
the last section, I take up a more recent, metaphysical challenge, which 
asks how normative properties can be fundamental and at the same time 
supervene on other properties. Does not that violate Hume’s Dictum, the 
ban on “necessary connections between distinct existences”? 
The heart of my response to Blackburn is an idea I got from Kit Fine.1 It is 
that normative predicates express subtly different senses when they are ap-
plied to particular things and to kinds, respectively. The kind-applying 
senses are basic and primitive, while the particular-applying senses are de-
fined in terms of them. A particular thing is goodPAR, for example, just in 
case it is a token of a goodKIN kind. But then, since two descriptive twins are 
tokens of exactly the same kinds, they must either both be goodPAR or both 
not be. Supervenience falls out of the definitions of the particular-applying 
normative concepts. 
This account is a cognitivist analogue of R. M. Hare (1952) and Allan Gib-
bard’s (1990) non-cognitivist accounts. They also analyse ascriptions of a 
normative predicate to a particular in terms of a general commitment (in 
the case of Hare, a universal prescription, and in the case of Gibbard, en-
dorsement of a norm). My account applies the same structure in a truth-
conditional framework. In honour of Hare, I call it cognitive universalism. 
I do not try to motivate cognitivism over non-cognitivism in this paper. My 
main message is that cognitivists of all stripes – even Moorean non-
naturalists – can explain the analyticity of supervenience in the same ele-
                                                 
1 In discussion. Many thanks to Fine for the idea; all mistakes, of course, are mine. 
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gant way that Hare and Gibbard have shown us. 
In the last part of the paper I turn to metaphysics. I argue that nonnatural 
realists should just repeat, at the level of properties, the explanation of 
supervenience that cognitive universalism provides at the level of concepts. 
Just as they should say that the basic normative concepts apply to kinds, so 
they should say that the basic normative properties are second-order; they 
do not apply to particular things, but rather to kinds, or perhaps to proper-
ties. I argue, in other words, that nonnatural realists should be platonists. 
1. Blackburn’s challenge 
Blackburn’s challenge is to explain why normative judgments exhibit a pe-
culiar combination of independence and dependence vis-a-vis descriptive 
judgments. Let us start with the independence. From G. E. Moore (1903) 
onwards, nonnatural realists have said that at least some normative con-
cepts are primitive, indefinable, basic. Perhaps some of them can be de-
fined in terms of others, perhaps they form an interdefinable cluster, but no 
normative concept can be defined in entirely non-normative terms. Promi-
nent candidates for primitiveness include GOOD and BAD (Moore); BEING A 
REASON FOR (Parfit, Nagel, Scanlon); and OUGHT (Broome, Wedgwood). I 
want to be neutral on this issue, and will switch liberally between different 
normative concepts in my exposition. 
The independence at issue is more than primitiveness. RED, for example, 
could be primitive and yet not have the relevant kind of independence from 
descriptive concepts, being one of them itself. But nonnatural realists fur-
ther maintain that normative concepts are different in kind from descriptive 
concepts. Descriptive concepts are used to judge how things are; normative 
concepts are used to judge how they should be; and these are different 
kinds of judgment. 
The upshot is that descriptions never entail evaluations. There is no de-
scription D such that 
(1) a is D. 
entails 
(2) a is good. 
Or as Blackburn puts it: “There is no moral proposition whose truth is en-
tailed by any proposition ascribing naturalistic properties to its subject” 
(1993, 116). 
So far independence. But there is also a close connection between norma-
tive and descriptive judgment. As far as I know, every prominent nonnatu-
ral realist accepts that it is in some sense a conceptual truth that things have 
their value in virtue of being the way they are descriptively, and that value 
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therefore supervenes on descriptive properties.2 
Speaking now in my own voice, I believe the best way to make this precise 
is as follows. What I want to say is not that any grand supervenience prin-
ciple is itself analytic, but rather that ordinary English sentences and infer-
ences that exemplify certain principles are analytic.3 Keeping in mind 
throughout that descriptive likeness includes both properties and relations, I 
take it that the inference from 
(2) a is good. 
(3) b is descriptively exactly like a 
to 
(4) b is good. 
is analytic, and likewise 
(5) If Ted is good, then it is impossible to be just like Ted in every de-
scriptive respect and not be good. 
Sentence (5) exemplifies 
Strong normative-descriptive supervenience: for all possible x, y: if x 
and y are alike in every descriptive respect, then x and y are alike in 
every normative respect. 
while the inference from (2) and (3) to (4), exemplifies both strong and 
Weak normative-descriptive supervenience: for all x, y in the same pos-
sible world: if x and y are alike in every descriptive respect, then x 
and y are alike in every normative respect. 
Strictly speaking, the principles themselves are not analytic, because they 
are not true in virtue of the meanings of the words that figure in them alone; 
perhaps they are in some sense true in virtue of the meanings of “good”, 
“bad”, etc., but these words do not figure in the principles. There, rather, 
we find the term of art “normative”, and I doubt that its meaning guarantees 
supervenience. But speaking loosely, I will say that both weak and strong 
supervenience are analytic, in the derivative sense that ordinary English 
                                                 
2 Notice that Blackburn uses “naturalistic” to describe the supervenience base. 
While I have no problem with this, it tends to invite needless distractions having to 
do with Divine Command Theory. I therefore use “descriptive” instead. In order to 
head off Sturgeon’s (2008) worries, let me stress that I am not referring to the prop-
erties picked out by this or that descriptive vocabulary. “Descriptive property” is 
meant to convey a metaphysical notion, probably primitive, but sometimes eluci-
dated with the phrase “ways things can be”. 
3 A sentence “exemplifies” a principle just in case its negation contradicts the prin-
ciple; an inference exemplifies it just in case the premises together with the negation 
of the conclusion contradict it. Of course, in this sense the supervenience principles 
exemplify themselves, but as we shall see, they are not “ordinary English senten-
ces”, hence they fall outside the analyticity claim. 
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sentences and inferences that exemplify them are analytic. 
Are they analytic in this sense? Here is Blackburn’s comment: 
One thing, then, that must be established in defending this part of the 
argument is that if somebody claimed, say, that an action was abso-
lutely identical in every respect with another, except that it was much 
worse; or that a feature of character like courage had changed in no way 
in its nature, relations, consequences, but yet was of much less value 
than formerly; it would be a logical and not merely a moral mistake that 
had been made. (ibid, 116) 
R. M. Hare: 
we cannot say ‘P is exactly like Q in all respects save this one, that P is 
a good picture and Q not’. If we were to say this, we should invite the 
comment, ‘But how can one be good and the other not, if they are ex-
actly alike? There must be some further difference between them to 
make one good and the other not.’ Unless we at least admit the rel-
evance of the question ‘What makes one good and the other not?’ we 
are bound to puzzle our hearers; they will think that something has gone 
wrong with our use of the word ‘good’. Sometimes we cannot specify 
just what it is that makes one good and the other not; but there always 
must be something. Suppose that in the attempt to explain our meaning 
we said: ‘I didn't say that there was any other difference between them; 
there is just this one difference, that one is good and the other not. 
Surely you would understand me if I said that one was signed and the 
other not, but that there was otherwise no difference? So why shouldn't 
I say that one was good and the other not, but that there was otherwise 
no difference?’ The answer to this protest is that the word ‘good’ is not 
like the word ‘signed’; there is a difference in their logic. (1952, p. 81) 
I will not try to defend these analyticities, or analyticity in general, in this 
paper. I will only report that I share Hare and Blackburn’s intuitions. If an 
interlocutor repeatedly flouted supervenience, by calling some things 
“good” and other things “not good” on the basis of no descriptive differ-
ence whatever, then I would be left with nothing else to think than that her 
word “good” meant something other than mine. It would be like talking 
with someone who said both “x knows that p” and “p is false”. 
The dialectical situation is this: I will shortly present Blackburn’s objec-
tion, namely that nonnatural realists cannot explain these analyticities, and 
then respond to his objection by offering an explanation. It is somewhat 
ironic that, if I should succeed perfectly, my reward will be to get in trouble 
with those who deny the analyticities in the first place, perhaps because 
they reject the notion of analyticity altogether. But c'est la vie; one has to 
start theorising from some conception of the data, as best one can discern 
them. 
The stage is set for Blackburn’s objection: 
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if A has some naturalistic properties, and is also good, but its goodness 
is a distinct further fact not following from the naturalistic features, and 
if B has those features as well, then it follows that B is also good. And 
this is a puzzle for the realist, because there is no reason at all, on his 
theory, why this should follow. If the goodness is, as it were, an ex 
gratia payment to A, one to which A is not as a matter of logic entitled 
in virtue of being as it is in all naturalistic respects, then it should be 
consistent to suppose that although goodness was given to A, it was not 
given to B, which merely shares the naturalistic features that do not en-
tail the goodness. […] Supervenience becomes, for the realist, an op-
aque, isolated logical fact for which no explanation can be proffered. 
(1993, p. 118-9) 
The objection is that nonnatural realists have no good explanation of the 
analyticity of supervenience, exemplified by entailments like the one from 
(2) and (3) to (4).4 The view that normative predicates are primitive or un-
analysable seems to prevent us from pointing to any feature of their mean-
ing that would produce this entailment. The only option seems to be to take 
supervenience as a further primitive; to say that it is just a basic fact about 
the meanings of normative terms that they behave this way. That is what 
Allan Gibbard, for example, thinks the nonnatural realist has to say: 
A non-naturalistic “moral realist” can present certain features of ethical 
concepts as brute truths: that, for example, whether an act is right or 
wrong depends on its natural properties. […] Such a theorist, though, 
offers no explanation at all of the features of moral and other normative 
concepts. My aim in this book is to render normative concepts unmys-
terious, to explain those features of ethical concepts that such a non-
naturalist can only treat as brute. (2003, p. 20) 
                                                 
4 Blackburn later (1985) restated the argument as follows: Suppose we judge a thing 
to be good. We are then committed to there being some collection of descriptive 
properties and relations that underlie its goodness. Put all these together in a big, 
conjunctive property F. Include in F also all its normatively relevant negative prop-
erties, that is, include not being G, if being G would have destroyed its goodness. 
The big descriptive property F, then, suffices for goodness, or so we think. If de-
scriptions never entail evaluations, there will be conceptually possible worlds in 
which the F’s are not good, as well as worlds in which the F’s are good. But since 
every normatively relevant property and relation, both positive and negative, is in-
cluded in F, there will not be any conceptually possible “mixed worlds”, in which 
some of the F’s are good and others not. 
This strikes Blackburn as odd. If there are conceptually possible worlds in which the 
F’s are good, and ones in which they are not good, then why are there no concep-
tually possible worlds in which, say, half of them are good? Blackburn thinks it is 
implausible to have such a “ban on mixed worlds” without giving any explanation 
for it. 
The account I will offer meets this restated argument in exactly the same way as the 
original version, so I will not discuss it any further in the text. 
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My own theory explains much that non-naturalism takes as brute fea-
tures of the non-natural realm. If the good exercises its own sover-
eignty, why does goodness depend on natural fact? That’s just the way 
the concept works, the non-naturalist must be reduced to saying: it just 
does. (2003, p. 184) 
I agree with Blackburn and Gibbard that this would be a weak position. It is 
not an inviting view to maintain that there are just three things to say about, 
say, the concept GOOD, namely a) it is primitive, b) it is not descriptive, and 
c) it cannot apply to one but not the other of two descriptive twins. If the 
concept is primitive, where does this restriction come from? 
However, I believe c) has an underlying explanation, to which I now turn. 
2. Cognitive universalism 
I begin with weak supervenience, the rule about evaluation of worldmates. 
I will add an hypothesis in section 5 that will take us from the weak to the 
strong principle. 
The account begins by noticing that normative predicates can grammati-
cally apply both to particulars (dated, non-repeatable things) and to kinds 
(timeless things that can have instances). We can say that Florence Night-
ingale was good or that altruism is good; we can say that the Iraq war was 
wrong or that larceny is wrong. One might think this is merely a surface 
phenomenon, because normative claims about kinds are covertly quantifi-
cational. For example, “Altruism is good” might be analysed as saying that 
all, or typical, or that in general, instances of altruism are good. On such 
analyses, notice, some quantifier binds a variable, the variable ranges over 
particulars, and the predicate is applied to the variable. After the sentence 
has been interpreted, then, the normative predicate is applied to particulars 
also in general claims. 
I will defend a different account of such claims, on which the normative 
predicates are genuinely applied to kinds. For example, “Altruism is good” 
does not say that all/typical/in general instances of altruism are good. It 
says that altruism, a kind of motivation, is itself good. 
Before I explain this proposal, I should mention that we are not compelled 
to treat all such claims the same way. It could be that some are quantifica-
tional and others kind-referring, or that some allow both readings. It seems 
plausible that many non-normative uses of “good” or “bad” should be ana-
lysed as quantificational generic claims or “generics”. For example, per-
haps “Apple pie is good” should be analysed: in general, if x is an instance 
of apple pie, then x is good. Perhaps some apparently kind-referring norma-
tive claims are also quantificational generics, or at least permit such read-
ings. The account I will propose is perfectly compatible with this possi-
bility, albeit in a roundabout way.5 But for ease of exposition I will present 
                                                 
5 Once I distinguish the pro tanto and all-things-considered readings (discussed be-
low), I am personally not able to get an exception-allowing, generic reading of “Ly-
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a “clean” view on which the relevant claims are always kind-referring. 
The proposal, then, is that normative predicates can apply both to particu-
lars and to kinds, not just superficially but also after the sentence has been 
interpreted. The next question is how to explain the logical relationship be-
tween claims about kinds and claims about particulars. This issue may take 
a moment to register, given how used we are to quantificational analyses of 
general claims. Explaining logical relations between general and particular 
claims is just what quantifiers do. For example, taking us from “All F’s are 
G’s” together with “a is F” to “a is G” is just what “all” does. But suppose 
“Murder is wrong” has the simple logical form WRONG(MURDER). Suppose 
further that “a is an instance of murder” and “a is wrong” have the logical 
forms INSTANCE(a,MURDER) and WRONG(a), respectively. In that case we 
lose the logical relation between these claims; the three formulas in small-
caps are logically independent of each other. 
This is an appropriate result in other cases. Claims of the form “Kind K is 
F” do not always imply anything about whether individual K’s are F. For 
example, the Monsanto Company has patented the genetically modified 
corn Genuity VT Triple PRO. Which seems to make 
(6) Monsanto owns Genuity VT Triple PRO. 
true. But nothing follows about who owns the kind’s instances; (6) is com-
patible with Monsanto being sold out of Genuity..., all the physical corn 
thus being the property of others. 
But in the normative case, there are clearly logical relations between claims 
about kinds and claims about particulars. It would be incoherent to say that 
murder is wrong but that each murder has no tendency to be wrong. If this 
is not explained by a silent quantifier in “Murder is wrong”, then how is it 
explained? 
A natural idea would be to reinstate the quantificational approach at the 
level of lexical semantics, in the following way: to say that “wrong”, when 
applied to a kind, does not express the concept WRONG, but the concept 
WRONG*, which in turn has the definition BEING SUCH THAT ALL ONE’S IN-
STANCES ARE WRONG. In other words, the sentence would not have a quanti-
fier in it, its logical form would just be WRONG*(MURDER). But the defini-
tion of WRONG* would in turn have a quantifier in it, which generates the 
entailment from “Murder is wrong” and “a is a murder” to “a is wrong”. Or 
perhaps one would prefer to define WRONG* as BEING SUCH THAT, IN GEN-
ERAL, ONE’S INSTANCES ARE WRONG, in which case “Murder is wrong” to-
gether with “a is a murder” would provide some kind of defeasible support 
                                                 
ing is wrong”, but suppose we want one. On my account it would be GENx [LY-
ING(x)] (WRONGPAR(x)), which, given the definition that will shortly be offered in the 
text, would in turn be analysed as GENx [LYING(x)] (∃K [TOKEN(x,K) & WRONG-
KIN(K)]). “GEN” is a quantifier that means, roughly, “in general”. 
 8 Skarsaune, How To Be a Moral Platonist 
for “a is wrong”. 
However, for reasons I will give later, I believe we should instead explain 
the logical relations from the opposite direction; we should take normative 
predicates to express simple senses when they are applied to kinds, and 
complex senses when they are applied to particulars. 
Concerning the kind-applying senses, in other words, I suggest that non-
natural realists should carry on saying the things we have always said about 
normative concepts (primitive, irreducible, simple, basic, fundamental). But 
for the particular-applying senses, we should not say those things. These 
senses are, on the contrary, complex and definable. Not, though, in terms of 
non-normative concepts, but in terms of the kind-applying ones. For exam-
ple, let GOODPAR and GOODKIN be the particular- and kind-applying senses, 
respectively, of “good”. Then we can define the former in terms of the lat-
ter, as follows: 
CU: GOODPAR(x) ↔def ∃K [TOKEN(x,K) & GOODKIN(K)] 
A particular is goodPAR just in case it is a token of a goodKIN kind. 
The variable “K” ranges over descriptive kinds. War, for example, is an 
event kind; eating bananas is an act kind, being happy is a kind of mental 
state. Importantly, there is no restriction on how general or specific the 
kinds are. The range of K includes eating bananas while sitting on a train 
passing by a lake, and even kinds that cannot be expressed in English at 
any length. 
However, we should not include so-called haecceitic kinds in the range of 
K. A kind is haecceitic if it concerns a specified individual. For example, 
buying Mary a bucket of roses and moving to Dallas are haecceitic kinds. 
The motivation for this restriction is that normative concepts do not permit 
mere haecceitic differences to make a normative difference. In other words, 
we should understand “alike in every descriptive respect” in our superveni-
ence principles to mean “alike with respect to all qualitative descriptive 
properties and relations”. My impression is that that is what Hare, Black-
burn and most participants in the subsequent debate have intended.6 
                                                 
6 One exception is Matthew Kramer (2009, ch. 10). He points out that many reli-
gious believers think being pleasing to God is normatively relevant, but they can 
hardly be accused of conceptual confusion. He also imagines a man who favours 
acts that benefit France, but not because France has any interesting descriptive prop-
erties, or because he is French or stands in any other interesting relation to France. 
I do not find these examples convincing. The example from religion is misleading, 
because religious believers think God’s opinion matters because he has certain 
qualitative properties (power, wisdom) and stands in certain qualitative relations to 
them (has created them, cares about them). It is not clear that anyone thinks God’s 
haecceitic identity makes a difference, so that, for example, we could have another 
qualitatively identical world, with a qualitatively identical creator, but the people 
over there have no reason to obey their creator. 
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Like properties, kinds can have instances/tokens. For example, the Thirty-
years’ war is a token of the kind war, and I am an instance of the kind 
Homo Sapiens. A kind and a particular stand in the tokening-relation just in 
case the particular is an instance of the kind. 
The right-to-left direction of CU predicts that, if GOODKIN applies to a kind, 
then GOODPAR applies to every instance of the kind. That might seem too 
strong. For example, we might be inclined to accept both 
(7) Knowledge is good. 
and 
(8) Oedipus’ learning that Jocasta was his mother was not good. 
But this is not a counterexample. The explanation is that “good” has two 
senses along another dimension. It is widely agreed that normative predi-
cates can express both pro tanto and all-things-considered senses.7 And we 
must distinguish these before we apply CU. For example, in (7) we have 
PRO-TANTO-GOODKIN, and in (8) we have ALL-THINGS-CONSIDERED-GOODPAR. 
Under those readings, (7) and (8) are jointly compatible with CU. 
This is not an ad hoc move: the distinction between pro tanto and all-
things-considered senses is independently motivated. And the prediction 
that, if a normative concept applies to a kind, then the corresponding par-
ticular-applying concept applies to every instance, is confirmed by intu-
ition. For example, if you think (8) is true, then you will not get (7) to be 
true if you force the all-things-considered reading. And if you think know-
ledge is pro tanto good, you will not get (8) to be true if you force the pro 
tanto reading. 
So far I have discussed “good”, but I think parallel analyses apply at least 
for “bad”, “right”, “wrong”, “just”, “unjust”, “fair” and “unfair”, or more 
accurately for both the pro tanto and the all-things considered senses of 
                                                 
The thought experiment with the Francophile is also weak. We need to imagine two 
qualitatively identical countries, France and Schmance, and our man must stand in 
the same qualitative relations to both. So he did not, for example, spend the sum-
mers of his youth in one of them; nor does he have different feelings towards them. 
He knows all this, but still, on the basis of no other difference whatsoever, he calls 
acts that benefit France “good” and acts that benefit Schmance “not good”. Then I 
would simply repeat Hare’s intuition from section 1: I would be left with nothing 
else to think than that “something has gone wrong with his use of the word ‘good’”. 
7 If an act is pro tanto wrong, then it has something wrong about it, even though it 
may also have something right about it. If it has more wrong than right about it, then 
it is all-things-considered-wrong. Some writers distinguish pro tanto concepts from 
prima facie concepts (the difference is not important for my purposes here); if both 
exist, then we can apply CU to each of them. 
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these.8 CU, then, is a general recipe for defining particular-applying senses 
of normative predicates in terms of their kind-applying senses. 
CU has the same structure as R. M. Hare’s universal prescriptivism (1952), 
and Alan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism (1990). These accounts also ana-
lyse ascriptions of a normative predicate to a particular in terms of a gen-
eral commitment; in the case of Hare, a universal prescription, and in the 
case of Gibbard, endorsement of a norm. In both cases, the general com-
mitment is existentially quantified.9 What the new account achieves is to 
make that insight of Hare and Gibbard’s available in a truth-conditional 
framework. In a nod to Hare, I will call it cognitive universalism. 
The view now presented, I will proceed to give some reasons to accept it. 
The first is that it explains the analyticity of weak supervenience, and as we 
shall see in section 5, also that of strong supervenience, when we combine 
it with a further hypothesis about normative predicates. But let us start with 
the weak. The challenge is to explain things like the analytical entailment 
from 
(2) a is good. 
(3) b is descriptively exactly like a 
to 
(4) b is good. 
The explanation is this. From (2), by UC, it follows that there is some kind, 
let us call it “L”, such that a is a token of L, and L is goodKIN. From (3) and 
our definitions of kind and of the tokening-relation, it follows that b is a 
token of exactly the same kinds as a. So in particular, b is a token of L, 
which, recall, is goodKIN, and so by UC, 
(4) b is good. 
It should be straightforward to see how this generalises to the other norma-
tive predicates, and also to the case where a is not good (in which case it 
follows that b is not good either). 
We have, in effect, replaced a situation where we had a primitive concept 
GOOD, and a brute conceptual necessity (supervenience), with a situation 
where we have a primitive concept GOODKIN and a defined concept GOODPAR. 
Weak supervenience just falls out of the definition of GOODPAR. 
                                                 
8 I think analyses similar in spirit, but perhaps different in detail, apply for “reason” 
and “ought”. And I suspect that aesthetic predicates like “beautiful” behave in this 
way too. 
9 For Gibbard, to say that a particular act is rational is to express acceptance of 
some norm that permits it. For Hare, to say that a particular act is right is to com-
mand everyone to act likewise in like circumstances (without specifying the act or 
the circumstances). 
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3. Bedfellows 
It might seem extravagant to posit a systematic duplication of predicate 
senses, just in order to explain the analyticity of supervenience. But in this 
section, I will present independent linguistic evidence for this duplication. I 
believe we should posit it anyway; not just for normative predicates but in-
deed across language. 
The issue is tied to another feature of the account just given; its division of 
labour between sentence semantics and lexical semantics. The work of ex-
plaining truth conditions and inferential relations between sentences is not 
done in a single step, at the level of logical form; a significant part of the 
job is relegated to lexical semantics. I will begin by saying something more 
to motivate and explain this general approach. 
It is nearly uncontroversial that kind-selecting predicates like “extinct”, 
“widespread”, “invented by” and “legalise” only take kinds as subjects. 
Consider 
(9) Skateboarding was invented by bored surfers. 
(10) Cain invented fratricide. 
The predicates are true of the act kinds in question, but are not true of any 
of their instances. For example, “invented by Cain” does not apply to any 
of the particular fratricides. Granted, we can come up with a more compli-
cated quantificational story that captures the truth conditions (roughly, Cain 
committed a fratricide at some time t, and there were no fratricides before 
t). Similarly, maybe we can come up with quantificational truth conditions 
for 
(11) Mehmed II legalised fratricide. 
(What makes it difficult is that (11) could be true even if there never were 
any fratricides, but we do not want it to be vacuously true in that case.) If 
we multiply examples like these, a defender of the quantificational ap-
proach would have to produce ever more complicated hypotheses about 
logical form. That is not in itself a damning objection – in one sense, these 
claims do have complicated meanings. But the problem is that the com-
plexity does not seem to lie with the sentences, but rather with the predi-
cates. We will capture what is going on better if we assign sentences like 
(11) a rather simple logical form, and instead assign “legalise” a rich lexi-
cal semantics. 
This point is reinforced by the fact that the inference from (10) and (11) to 
(12) Mehmed II legalised something Cain invented. 
seems like a very simple inference. But on the quantificational approach it 
would not be, because all these sentences would have hugely complex logi-
cal forms. 
The natural view to take of these examples is that, as far as sentence se-
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mantics is concerned, NP’s occurring together with kind-selecting predi-
cates really do refer to kinds. For example, the logical forms of (11) and 
(12) are just 
(11*) LEGALISED(MEHMED, FRATRICIDE) 
(12*) ∃x [LEGALISED(MEHMED, x) & INVENTED(CAIN, x)] 
This view does not imply that (11) is true because Mehmed II performed 
some mysterious act on an abstract object (the act kind fratricide). Clearly, 
what ultimately makes (11) true is that he performed certain particular acts; 
perhaps he signed a document or made an announcement in the town 
square. Similarly, (9) is true because a gang of bored surfers performed 
some particular, pioneering acts of skateboarding. That is how you legalise, 
or invent, an act kind. But the point is that this information belongs in the 
lexical semantics of the predicates, not in the logical form of the sentences. 
In other words; understanding what these claims ultimately demand about 
the occurrence of particular acts in the world is not a matter of understand-
ing the logical form of the sentences, but of understanding what the predi-
cates mean. 
The upshot is that we must distinguish between two levels of truth condi-
tions. First we have the results of semantic analysis of sentences; we can 
think of the results of this analysis as sentence truth conditions or logical 
form. But it would be a mistake to think of these as giving us a picture of 
what the world must be like in order for the sentence to be true. We must 
check with lexical semantics first, to see whether any of the items that oc-
cur in logical form should be further analysed, before we get to what we 
can call worldly truth conditions.10 So for example, because we understand 
what “widespread” means, we understand that the worldly truth condition 
of “Bedbugs are widespread in Brooklyn” does not involve some abstract 
object being spread out over Brooklyn, but rather that there be concrete 
bedbugs at many locations across the borough. 
Once we employ this division of labour between sentence and lexical se-
mantics, and make the corresponding distinction between logical form and 
worldly truth conditions, it becomes extremely plausible that ordinary par-
                                                 
10 Related distinctions are drawn, in a similar context, by Koslicki (1999) and Les-
lie (2008). 
The division of labour I discuss here, between sentence and lexical semantics, 
should not be confused with the division of labour between semantics (as a whole) 
and metaphysics. How to draw that line is another huge subject. But I take it that 
there are clear cases on either side of the line. For example, understanding what 
kind-selecting predicates demand about particular tokens is clearly on the semantic 
side. Someone who does not understand that “The Dodo is extinct” is true iff there 
once were Dodos, but none now, simply does not understand what “extinct” means. 
On the other hand, reduction of truths about chairs to truths about atoms arranged 
chairwise is clearly on the metaphysical side. One cannot get this reduction just on 
the basis of understanding concepts. 
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ticular-applying predicates, like “have four legs” or “fifty feet tall” are also 
capable of expressing kind-applying senses. Consider 
(13) Panthera tigris has four legs. 
(14) There was a dinosaur species that was fifty feet tall. 
It is extremely plausible that “have four legs” in (13) is predicated of the 
kind Panthera tigris, and that “fifty feet tall” in (14) is predicated of a vari-
able that the rest of the sentence relates to a dinosaur species. 
But (13) does not say that tiger-kind has four legs in the same sense as Bo 
the dog. Roughly, what (13) says about tiger-kind is that its genetically 
normal, unmolested tokens have four legs. Likewise, what (14) says about 
the dinosaur species is that its healthy adult tokens were about 50 feet tall. 
Someone who does not understand this does not understand the claims be-
ing made. But since this is not encoded in logical form, the work must be 
done by the predicates instead. 
The view, then, is that the logical forms (ignoring time) are 
(13*) HAVE-FOUR-LEGS*(PANTHERA TIGRIS) 
(14*) ∃x [DINOSAUR SPECIES(x) & FIFTY-FEET-TALL*(x)] 
where HAVE-FOUR-LEGS* is the concept BEING SUCH THAT ONE’S GENETI-
CALLY NORMAL, UNMOLESTED TOKENS HAVE FOUR LEGS, and FIFTY-FEET-
TALL* is the concept BEING SUCH THAT ONE’S HEALTHY ADULT TOKENS ARE 
ABOUT 50 FEET TALL. 
The view is not that all these predicate senses are lexicalised. Plausibly, the 
usual case is that the particular-applying senses are lexicalised, while suit-
able kind-applying senses are constructed ad hoc, in order to get reasonable 
interpretations. For example, if I say “The English Setter weighs between 
40 and 50 pounds”, you construct a suitable kind-applying sense of “weigh 
between 40 and 50 pounds” on the spot, in order to get a sensible interpre-
tation. 
This account predicts that, if we apply a predicate to a particular-referring 
and a kind-referring NP at the same time, the result should be at least 
mildly zeugmatic. Zeugmas are not ungrammatical, but feel a bit like puns, 
in that a word is used to mean two different things at the same time. Since 
the particular-applying and kind-applying senses are so closely related, the 
effect is not likely to be as strong as in “He took his hat and his leave”, but 
it should be perceptible. As indeed 
(15) Bo and Panthera tigris both have four legs. 
(16) Equus zebra and uncle Bob live in Africa. 
testify. 
I have given some reasons to think it is a common phenomenon that predi-
cates express different senses when they are applied to particulars and to 
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kinds, respectively. And I have explained the general framework I think 
this kind of view should be located in. Turning now to normative language 
in particular, I will present some evidence that normative predicates can be 
applied to kind-referring NP’s (I assume it is clear that they can be applied 
to particular-referring NP’s, as in “Florence Nightingale was good”). 
Since “widespread” is a kind-selecting predicate, “murder” refers to a kind 
in 
(17) Murder is widespread. 
But then it seems that “wrong” is applied to a kind in 
(18) Murder is widespread and wrong. 
(19) Murder is widespread even though it is wrong. 
Likewise, we can apply “good” to a variable that the rest of the sentence 
relates to a kind: 
(20) Some kinds of charity are good. 
There is independent evidence, then, that normative predicates can be ap-
plied both to particulars and to kinds, not just superficially but in logical 
form. The main reason to think that they express different senses in the two 
uses has already been given: otherwise it would be hard to explain the logi-
cal relations between the two sorts of claim. In addition, and finally, I sug-
gest there is a feeling of zeugma when we apply a normative predicate to 
kind-referring and particular-referring NP’s at the same time: 
(21) The war in Iraq and sexual harassment are wrong. 
(22) Philanthropy and Warren Buffett are virtuous. 
4. Why the kind-applying senses are basic 
There remains, though, a deep contrast between normative language, on the 
one hand, and at least most descriptive language, on the other. Even if kind-
reference is fairly common at the level of sentence semantics or logical 
form, in the descriptive case it will at least usually be “analysed away” in 
lexical semantics, so that, when we get to worldly truth conditions, we are 
left with only particulars and their properties and relations. 
For example, in the case of kind-selecting predicates like “invent” and 
“widespread”, even though these are applied to kinds in logical form, this 
kind-reference is analysed away in lexical semantics. Just by knowing what 
“widespread” means, we know that what it is for a kind to be widespread is 
for it to have instances in many, scattered locations. So the worldly truth 
conditions of “widespread”-claims are about particulars and their properties 
and relations. 
There may also be areas of descriptive language that do not work like this; 
areas where kind-reference and predication of properties to kinds persist all 
the way to worldly truth conditions. I am neutral on this issue. But I will 
argue that normative language works in this second way. In fact, normative 
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worldly truth conditions are always about kinds, and never about particu-
lars. 
This is because the kind-applying senses of normative predicates are basic. 
So a normative claim about a kind, like “Murder is wrong”, will not be re-
duced in terms of particulars at any level of semantic analysis. It logical 
form is WRONGKIN(MURDER) and its worldly truth condition is also WRONG-
KIN(MURDER). 
On the other hand, applications of normative concepts to particulars are 
analysed away at the level of lexical semantics. However, they are given 
mixed worldly truth conditions, in part descriptive, in part normative. For 
example, “Bob is good” has the logical form GOODPAR(BOB). Applying the 
definition of GOODPAR, we get the worldly truth condition  
 ∃K (TOKEN(BOB,K) & GOODKIN(K)).  
Bob is a token of some descriptive kind or other, such that that kind is 
goodKIN. So the descriptive part of the truth condition is still about the par-
ticular, Bob. But the normative part, saying that the relevant kind is good-
KIN, ascribes a normative property to a kind, not to a particular. 
Cognitive universalism, then, predicts that normative judgments about 
kinds are basic, in the following sense: the worldly truth conditions of 
normative claims are either purely about kinds, or else mixed, but with the 
normative part being about kinds. Normative language bottoms out in truth 
conditions about kinds. I have already given the main reason to believe 
this; it explains the analyticity of (weak) supervenience. But we can also 
give an independent argument for this aspect of the view. It is plausible that 
normative claims about kinds are in this way basic, because they are epis-
temologically basic in a parallel way. Moral epistemology also bottoms out 
in judgments about kinds, as I will now explain. 
Let us start with a simple observation. In descriptive enquiry, we typically 
go from judgments about particulars to judgments about kinds. So, for ex-
ample, we might do ornithology in roughly the following fashion: 
(A) This bird sings in the morning and that bird sings in the morning 
and yonder bird… – and come to think of it, they are all robins! So 
it seems robins sing in the morning. 
But notice how backwards it would be to try to do ethics in a similar way: 
(B) This act is wrong and that act is wrong and yonder act… – and by 
golly, they are all sexual harassments! So it seems sexual harass-
ment is wrong. 
The direction of epistemic justification is the reverse in the normative case: 
we go from general normative judgments, and empirical judgments about 
particulars, to normative judgments about those particulars. For example, 
we go from the general judgment that using a position of power to pressure 
someone into bed is wrong, and the empirical judgment that that is what x 
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did to y, to the judgment that what x did to y was wrong. 
Granted, there are complications. We do sometimes arrive at normative 
judgments about kinds through investigation of their instances. For exam-
ple, we probably do not have a direct intuition that appointing relatives to 
government jobs is wrong. We arrive at this judgment by looking at count-
ries where that practice is common, and observing its typical effects. But 
this is not a counterexample to the point I am making. For what we then 
investigate about these instances is not their normative, but their descriptive 
properties. For example, we see that they lead to inequality of opportunity 
and loss of general utility. But our judgment that general utility and equal 
opportunity are good are in turn judgments about kinds, and not based on 
normative judgments about particulars. 
The extreme case of this epistemic structure is pure hedonic utilitarianism. 
For the committed utilitarian, normative enquiry will be a lot like empirical 
enquiry; particular cases will be decided by investigating their effects, and 
judgments about kinds will be a lot like inductive generalisations. But at 
the bottom of all this epistemic activity is the single ur-judgment that an act 
is right if and only if it maximises the balance of pleasure over pain. This is 
a judgment about kinds, and is not in turn arrived at by inference from par-
ticular cases. Take it away and the whole superstructure evaporates. 
The claim, then, is that all normative justification bottoms out in judgments 
about kinds. That may seem to contradict the popular view that moral epis-
temology proceeds by the method of reflective equilibrium; going back and 
forth between principles and cases, trying to find intuitively attractive prin-
ciples that yield intuitively attractive verdicts about cases, revising both 
kinds of intuitions as we go. But not really. For notice that “cases” here are 
not really particulars; they are instead narrowly circumscribed kinds. For 
example, we might well have as a fixed point in our normative reasoning 
that the Srebrenica Massacre was wrong. But this fixed point is not really 
that a particular act de re, the Srebrenica Massacre, was wrong. For imag-
ine we became convinced by some internet conspiracy theory that the 
“massacre” is in fact a fabrication of western propaganda. That would make 
us revise our normative beliefs about the event, and perhaps about particu-
lar political leaders, etc. But these “local” changes would not ramify into 
our wider normative belief system. We would still believe that killing eight 
thousand people on account of their ethnicity is wrong, and this belief would 
continue to play the role in our reflective equilibrium that we had hitherto 
(misleadingly) ascribed to the belief that the Srebrenica Massacre was 
wrong. 
The same point applies to everyday uses of our moral sensibility. Suppose 
for example that you witness a man subjecting another to some kind of hu-
miliating treatment for no good reason. You have an immediate gut reac-
tion telling you that what the first man is doing is wrong, and this in turn 
leads you infer that it is wrong to humiliate others needlessly. One might 
think that here, surely, is a case where a normative verdict about a particu-
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lar case supports a general normative conclusion. But that would again be 
misleading. For suppose you learn that the two men were in fact actors re-
hearsing a play. That would lead you to revise your normative verdict about 
that particular act (de re). But it would not lead you to conclude that it is 
OK to humiliate others needlessly after all; the lesson you learned about 
that still holds good.11 
In general, what matters to your normative thinking is not really your reac-
tion to particular cases de re, but your reaction to the descriptive properties 
you think these cases have, that is, to the kind you think they instantiate. 
What particular cases can do is to make this or that kind salient to us, by 
making a token salient, but it is our verdict about the kind that plays a role 
in our reflective equilibrium, not our verdict about the token. In this way, 
beliefs about particulars are epiphenomenal in our normative belief system; 
they are supported by but do not support beliefs about kinds. Reflective 
equilibrium is reached when our beliefs about more general kinds fit with 
our beliefs about more specific kinds. 
Normative enquiry, then, has exactly the structure we should expect if cog-
nitive universalism is true. Since normative claims about kinds are not gen-
eralisations over their instances, they are not justified in the way generalisa-
tions are justified, from premises about instances. Instead, they are justified 
either by some kind of direct conviction about the kind (say, that it is 
wrong to kill people on account of their ethnicity), or else by their coher-
ence in a network of judgments about kinds. And just as normative claims 
about particulars, in worldly truth conditions, factor into a descriptive com-
ponent about the particular, and a general normative component, so they 
are justified by evidence about the descriptive properties of the particular, 
and a general normative judgment or principle. 
5. Why strong supervenience is analytic 
Earlier, I postponed discussion of strong supervenience and its analyticity. 
My formulation of the principle was: 
Strong normative-descriptive supervenience: for all possible x, y: if x 
and y are alike in every descriptive respect, then x and y are alike in 
every normative respect. 
What I take to be analytic, again, are not such principles themselves, but 
ordinary claims and inferences that exemplify them. Since strong super-
venience coordinates the normative properties of individuals in different 
worlds, we have to look to modal or counterfactual claims in order to find 
sentences that exemplify the strong but not the weak principle. By their na-
ture, then, the relevant claims will be rather complicated in their non-
normative elements, which makes it more difficult to say whether they are 
analytic. Indeed, there may be no sharp line between what is analytic and 
                                                 
11 This point is from Fine (2005). 
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what is just very unarguably true. That being said, I would agree that  
(5) If Ted is good, then it is impossible to be just like Ted in every de-
scriptive respect and not be good. 
is analytic.12 But cognitive universalism does not in itself predict this. The 
antecedent entails that there is some kind T, such that Ted is a token of T, 
and T is goodKIN. The consequent, in effect, says that no one, in any possible 
world, is T but not goodPAR. But from T’s being goodKIN in the actual world, 
it does not obviously follow that T is goodKIN in all worlds. And if there is a 
world where T is not goodKIN, then CU allows people there to be T but not 
goodPAR. Before I explain why this does not happen, I will set the stage by 
discussing a different example, from mathematics. 
Syntactically, “47 is a prime number” is in the present tense. So one might 
think its truth condition is that 47 is prime at the time of utterance. After all, 
that is the semantical contribution the present tense usually makes. But it 
seems to me that someone who says  
(23) 47 is prime today, but on Thursday it will not be. 
is showing clear signs of conceptual confusion. Assuming they understand 
the rest of the sentence, they apparently do not understand “prime” ad-
equately. In other words, it is plausible that 
(24) If a number is prime, then it is always prime. 
is analytic. The explanation is that “prime” is a tenseless predicate; it may 
accept tense syntactically speaking (“was prime”, “will be prime”), but it 
does not really have tense semantically speaking. Exactly how to cash this 
out depends on your general semantical framework; perhaps the proposi-
tion expressed by “47 is prime” does not have a time parameter, or time 
argument. In any case, the result is this: if you fully understand “47 is 
prime”, then you know that you are not supposed to evaluate it with respect 
to any particular time. The result is that (23) is analytically false and (24) 
analytically true; but unobviously so, due to the subtle explanation of their 
analytic truth/falsehood. That seems about right. 
Suppose, next, that someone says 
(25) 47 is prime, but if Gore had won the Florida recount, 47 would not 
have been prime. 
That assertion would also seem to signal conceptual confusion. Given a 
yes/no choice, again, I would say that 
(26) If a number is prime, then it is necessarily prime. 
is analytic. The explanation is that “prime” is what Fine (2005) calls an 
“unworldly” predicate. This is the modal analogue of tenselessness. Again, 
exactly how to cash it out depends on one’s general semantical framework; 
perhaps the proposition expressed by “47 is prime” does not have a world 
                                                 
12 Like before, read “descriptively alike” to include both properties and relations. 
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parameter or world index. In any case, the result is this: if you fully under-
stand “47 is prime”, then you know you are not supposed to evaluate it with 
respect to any particular world. This makes (25) analytically false and (26) 
analytically true, but in an even more subtle and unobvious way than be-
fore; which again seems like a welcome prediction. 
The explanation, I propose, of the analyticity of strong supervenience, is 
cognitive universalism plus the fact that the basic, kind-applying senses of 
normative predicates are tenseless and unworldly. The analyticity of (5) is 
then explained as follows. From the antecedent, it follows by UC that Ted 
is a token of some kind, let us call it “T”, such that T is goodKIN. Since 
“goodKIN” is tenseless and unworldly, T is goodKIN in every world. But then, 
by UC, any possible thing that is T is also goodPAR, so the consequent is es-
tablished. 
The tenselessness and unworldliness of the kind-applying senses is easy to 
miss, because the words we use to express them also express particular-
applying senses, which are both tensed and worldly. Or more accurately, 
the particular-applying senses are “bastards”, having a worldly part (the 
descriptive part) and an unworldly part (the normative) in their definition. 
Another reason one might think normative claims about kinds are sensitive 
to time or world is that we often make such claims in a “parochial” way, 
leaving some background conditions implicit. For example, we think 
(27) Slavery is wrong. 
is true and obviously so. But it seems possible for slavery to be right; sup-
pose we come across an alien, intelligent species for which freedom is tor-
ture and servitude bliss, and which does not even have the potential to be 
happy in any other way. It seems it would be ok, perhaps a duty, to enslave 
them. 
It is important to notice, however, how we react to this kind of example. 
My reaction is to clarify what I mean by (27).13 When I now assert (27), I 
do not intend “slavery” to cover this kind of case; what I intend to say is 
that enslavement of humans and other creatures that are capable of au-
tonomy without agony, is wrong. 
There is no point in lengthy clarifications of precisely which act kind we 
are talking about when our interlocutor understands it perfectly well any-
way. There may be bizarre but metaphysically possible scenarios where 
slavery, rape, genocide, etc, would be ok; but it would only waste time and 
strain our interlocutor’s patience to enumerate outlandish exceptions that 
are irrelevant to the moral problems we are dealing with. 
The crucial point, again, is this: if such a faraway scenario is brought to at-
                                                 
13 As mentioned in section 2 and explained in footnote 5, my account can accom-
modate exception-allowing, generic readings for claims like (27). I cannot feel any 
such reading of (27), but if you can, restrict what I say in this section to the kind-
referring reading. 
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tention and made relevant, we treat it as calling for clarification of the claim 
we made, for example that slavery is wrong. We do not stick to the original 
claim but reserve it for the actual world; we do not conclude that slavery 
can be right but is actually wrong.  
A careful look at how we react to such examples, then, indicates that the 
kind-applying normative concepts are indeed unworldly. Which, together 
with cognitive universalism, explains the analyticity of strong superveni-
ence. I suggest  in conclusion that these explanatory advantages, and the 
structure of moral epistemology, makes cognitive universalism an attractive 
account of normative language. 
6. The metaphysical challenge 
There is another supervenience challenge facing nonnatural realism. We 
now have an explanation of why it is analytic that normative properties 
supervene on descriptive properties. But, ironically, nonnatural realists also 
have to explain why it is true that normative properties so supervene. That 
might seem confused: analyticity entails truth, so why is there still a prob-
lem? 
Because what is analytic is that the properties picked out by normative 
predicates supervene on descriptive properties. But it does not follow that 
nonnatural normative properties so supervene. That only follows if we as-
sume that normative predicates pick out nonnatural normative properties. 
But if we can give no independent assurance that nonnatural normative 
properties are well-behaved in respect of supervenience, and in fact have 
some reason to doubt it, then we have no right to this assumption. 
Cognitive universalism, in other words, is a theory about English; it ex-
plains why the normative part of our language behaves a certain way. Now 
we need to explain why the stuff in our theory behaves in the corresponding 
way.  
Why doubt it? The concern is that nonnatural realists claim that normative 
properties are fundamental and non-descriptive. They cannot be reduced in 
terms of our desires, beliefs, attitudes, or anything else; in fact they are 
properties of a different kind from all others. But on the other hand, given 
supervenience, they are each going to have a cointensional (necessarily co-
extensional) descriptive property. Take for example goodness: just look at 
all the good things in all the possible worlds, and put each of their profiles 
of descriptive properties and relations together in a long, disjunctive prop-
erty D. Given supervenience, goodness and D are cointensional: every pos-
sible good thing is also D, and every possible D thing is also good.14 
This result collides with Hume’s Dictum: the principle that there be no “ne-
cessary connections between distinct existences”. It is not obvious exactly 
what that means (c.f. Wilson (2010)), but in the present context it boils 
                                                 
14 See Jackson (1998, ch. 5) for a rigorous statement of this point. 
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down to a ban on distinct, cointensional properties. In other words: if, in 
every possible world, all the Fs are Gs and vice versa, then F and G are the 
same property. For if F and G are really different properties, then surely it 
is possible for something to be F without being G or vice versa? 
Hume’s Dictum is especially plausible for fundamental properties. If F is a 
fundamental property, then a thing x’s being F does not consist in some-
thing else being the case with x; x’s being F is just a basic fact. And like-
wise for x’s being G, if G is also fundamental. But if x’s being F is just a 
basic fact, then there should be another world that is otherwise like the 
given one, except that x is not F.15 And if x’s being G is another basic fact, 
then it would be strange if it were impossible to remove x’s F-ness without 
removing its G-ness. Thus, even looking just at a single thing x, it seems 
like it should be possible for fundamental properties to come apart. 
The worry, then, is that we have no good explanation of why nonnatural 
values or reasons would supervene on descriptive properties, and that, sup-
posing they do supervene, they will violate (a version of) Hume’s Dictum, 
by having cointensional descriptive properties (from which they are never-
theless supposed to be distinct). So if nonnatural realism is to be plausible, 
it needs to explain why nonnatural reasons or values supervene on descrip-
tive properties, and explain it in a way that either gets around Hume’s Dic-
tum, or else makes it plausible that (the relevant version of) the Dictum is 
false. 
7. Moral Platonism 
Many seem to think the nonnatural, irreducibly normative properties that 
Moore, Parfit, Nagel, etc, posit take particular things as their bearers. For 
example, that Moore posited a nonnatural property (“goodness”) that is in-
stantiated by things like Bill’s pleasure at time t from looking at picture x, or 
Bob’s knowing at t that p. Or that the irreducibly normative reasons Parfit 
posits are relations between particular facts and responses available to par-
ticular agents. For example, that the fact that Bill is in pain is a reason for 
Bob to give him an Aspirin. 
If that is the view, then it will indeed be mysterious why these properties 
should supervene on descriptive properties. Suppose we have, as a basic, 
irreducible fact, that the the fact that Bill in pain (and Bob is around with a 
spare Aspirin), is a reason for Bob to volunteer the Aspirin. Then why 
would it be impossible for Susan and Tracy, say, to find themselves in a 
similar predicament, but without Tracy having a similar reason? (Suppos-
ing, again, that the reason-givingness of Bill’s pain is a basic fact, not de-
                                                 
15 It may be that x would need some other property from F’s contrast class. For ex-
ample, if F is a shape, then x would take some other shape H. But if G is some other 
fundamental property (by hypothesis not a shape), then it would be strange if this 
change would have to result in the removal of x’s G-ness. 
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riving from some underlying, general normative fact.) 
But I see no reason why the view should take that form. The main intellec-
tual motivation behind nonnatural realism has always been a strong com-
mitment to certain pre-theoretical, first-order normative beliefs. And now 
that cognitive universalism has shown that these beliefs bottom out in truth 
conditions about what kinds of things have value or provide reasons, it is 
only natural to direct one’s metaphysical commitment accordingly: to facts 
about what kinds of things have value or provide reasons. 
And if we take up that metaphysical commitment, then there is no need to 
posit, in addition, irreducible normative properties that take particulars as 
their bearers. Instead, we can give a reductive account of the particular-
applying normative properties. For example, we can say that the property 
goodness (the one that takes particulars as bearers) is just the property be-
ing a token of a good kind. 
On this reductive view, we can explain why the values of particular things 
supervene on their descriptive properties. Whether or not a particular thing 
is good will depend on two things: i) which (descriptive) kinds it tokens, 
and ii) which (descriptive) kinds are good. The first part supervenes on the 
thing’s descriptive properties in a real and obvious way: it is a token of a 
given kind just in case it instantiates the corresponding property. The sec-
ond part, concerning which kinds of things are good, also supervenes on 
descriptive properties, but in a trivial, uninteresting sense. Facts about what 
kinds of things are good, nonnatural realists say, are necessary, and neces-
sary facts trivially supervene on everything (there can be no difference in 
the necessary facts without a difference in the Y-facts, for any Y you like, 
because there can be no difference in the necessary facts, period). 
The view requires metaphysical commitment not only to nonnatural norma-
tive properties, but also to kinds to serve as their bearers. If we have kinds 
in our metaphysics anyway, that is of course no problem, but not everybody 
does. However, suppose we have properties in our metaphysics, for inde-
pendent reasons. Then we can suit the view to our liking, as follows: in-
stead of saying the metaphysically basic fact that makes “causing needless 
pain is wrong” true is that the kind causing needless pain has the property 
wrong, we can say it is that the property causes needless pain has the prop-
erty wrongmaking. Rather than posit the kind pleasure to instantiate the 
property good, we can posit the property pleasant to instantiate the property 
goodmaking. And so on. For each basic, normative concept F that applies 
to kinds, we posit a corresponding F-making property that applies to prop-
erties. 
On this second view, the particular-applying property goodness will just be 
the property having a goodmaking property. Particular-applying wrongness 
will just be the property having a wrongmaking property. And so on. The 
explanation of supervenience proceeds as before.  
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I do not mean to suggest that there is a deep metaphysical difference be-
tween properties and kinds. There seems to be a shallow difference, marked 
by the linguistic phenomena above; the kind murder is wrong, but the 
property murderhood is not wrong (but wrongmaking). I am not com-
pletely sure what to think about this, but it seems to me that the two ver-
sions are different ways of spelling out the details of a single underlying 
view. The underlying view is that the basic normative properties are sec-
ond-order; they take universals, rather than particulars, as their bearers. 
Hence the name “moral platonism”. It is this broad view I want to defend.16 
For ease of exposition, I will revert to the kind-based view, but my discus-
sion applies equally to the property-based view. 
Moral platonism will, to be sure, leave something unexplained, and it will 
contain some necessary connections between distinct properties. But it is 
crucial to see exactly what is left unexplained, and exactly what these ne-
cessary connections are like. What is left unexplained is not supervenience, 
but rather (some of the) facts about which kinds of things are good, bad, 
wrong, etc. For example, that causing needless pain is wrong; that happi-
ness is good; that suffering is bad. Some of these facts may be explainable 
in terms of the others, but some of them are going to be basic, and admit of 
no further explanation. 
Everyone agrees it is a desideratum on metaethical theories that they should 
explain why the values of particular things supervene on their descriptive 
properties. Nonnatural realism can do that, using the reductive account of 
particular-applying normative properties, and appealing to facts about the 
values of kinds. So the question is whether it is OK to leave these latter 
facts unexplained. In other words, is it also a desideratum on metaethical 
theories that they should explain why suffering is bad, or why happiness is 
good, and so on? To me these seem like good places for explanations to 
end. But it is hard to argue about where explanations should end; so let us 
just record that the view developed here will have such commitments. 
But what about the necessity of these facts? Will they not give us “neces-
sary connections between distinct existences”? Yes they will, but it is im-
portant to see exactly what these connections are like. Actually they come 
in two forms. First, particular-applying normative properties will have 
cointensional descriptive properties, like goodness and D, as discussed 
above. But particular-applying goodness is not a fundamental property; it is 
just the property being a token of a good kind. That it necessarily co-occurs 
with D is just a trivial consequence of its definition, given that facts about 
the values of kinds are necessary. 
So the interesting necessary connections are these latter facts themselves. 
Take agony and badness, for example. The necessary connection between 
them is not co-occurrence, but instantiation. It is not that agony and (kind-
                                                 
16 The view is suggested by Mackie (1977, p. 23, 41) and superbly defended by For-
rest (1986). 
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applying) badness are instantiated by the same things; it is that agony itself 
instantiates badness, that agony is bad. In other words, the necessary con-
nection is that a first-order universal has a second-order universal. 
There are other examples of necessary connections between first- and sec-
ond-order universals. Crimson, for example, has the property of being a 
shade of red. And it has that property in every world, or in every world in 
which it exists, on an Aristotelian view of universals. That is not strange at 
all; of course we need not check, with any given world, to see whether 
crimson is a shade of red there. 
Necessary relations between first- and second-order universals, then, can-
not be ruled out as a matter of principle. We have to look at each case and 
see if a given first- and second-order universal are contingently or necessa-
rily related. In the case of determinables and determinates, it is plausible 
that the connections are necessary, because they hold in virtue of the nature 
of the universals themselves. Being a shade of red is part of what crimson 
is. 
The normative case is not like that. It is, for example, not part of what 
agony is that it is bad. But it is still intuitively plausible that we do not have 
to check with a given world to see whether agony is bad there. Or whether, 
say, treating another as a mere means is wrong there. If we keep in mind 
that we are considering the basic normative facts, they are intuitively not 
contingent. 
But why? I suggest the nonnatural realist should again look to the seman-
tics for guidance. The kind-applying normative concepts, I argued, are un-
worldly; the propositions they figure in are not to be evaluated with respect 
to this or that world. The metaphysical analogue of this is what Fine calls 
“transcendental” facts; facts that hold, not in every world, but independently 
of all the worlds (2005, ch 10). 
Fine makes a distinction, in other words, within the class of what is usually 
thought of as the necessary truths. The necessary truths proper are those 
that engage with each world, but in such a way as to come out true every 
time. “P or not-P” is one example; in some worlds it holds because “P” is 
true, in other worlds because “not-P” is. Another example is “Nothing is 
both red and green all over”. Whichever world it is evaluated at, it looks at 
every object in that world, but never finds a counter-instance. 
The transcendental truths, on the other hand, do not even engage the differ-
ent worlds; there is nothing in the worlds that they answer to for their truth. 
Mathematical claims are good examples: “Seven is a prime number” can 
only in a degenerate sense be said to be true “in” a given world, for there is 
nothing about any of the worlds that makes it true. 
The distinction between necessary and transcendent truths depends on a 
distinction between two ways of thinking about possible worlds. On what 
we can call the tractarian conception, a world is a totality of facts. The ac-
tual world is everything that is the case; a merely possible world is a way 
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everything could have been. On this conception, there will be no distinction 
between necessary and transcendental truths; the fact that seven is prime, 
for example, is a part of every world. 
On the second conception, a world is a totality of concrete substances and 
their attributes. If you specify all the concrete substances there ever are, and 
all the properties and relations they have throughout their careers, then you 
have specified a world. Let us call this the substantive conception of a 
world. The actual world, in this sense, is just the physical universe, but sub-
stantive worlds need not be physical; some have angels and spooks in them. 
The tractarian notion of possible worlds and the corresponding notion of 
necessity are useful for many purposes, but I suggest that they are not help-
ful in understanding the content of certain philosophical views. When the 
mathematical platonist says that mathematical facts are necessary, she is 
not well understood as saying that they hold, again and again, in each pos-
sible world. The mathematical facts hold once and for all, as it were; they 
belong to an “invariable framework” within which possibilities play out 
(Fine (2005 p. 326)). To make the point vivid, we can imagine God ponder-
ing which world to create. His alternatives are the substantive possible 
worlds, not the tractarian ones. Seven being a prime number is not some-
how a feature of every alternative, it is not a feature of any of them. The 
mathematical facts are already there, before he creates anything. 
Likewise, when nonnatural realists say the basic normative facts are neces-
sary (Parfit (2011, vol. 2 p. 489), Enoch (2011, p. 146), Scanlon (2014, pp. 
39-41)), they are not well understood as saying that these facts hold, again 
and again, in every world. They are part of the invariable framework. God 
may decide which world to create, but he does not get to say how good it 
will be if created. The basic normative facts are already there. 
The strong supervenience of particular-applying normative properties on 
descriptive properties is a natural consequence of this view. Whether or not 
the view violates Hume’s Dictum depends on how we understand the Dic-
tum, once the worldly/unworldly and necessary/transcendental distinctions 
have been made. One could combine moral platonism with a version of the 
Dictum, restricted to necessary relations between worldly properties (prop-
erties that figure in worldly facts), or between fundamental worldly proper-
ties. 
But a proponent of Hume’s Dictum could reasonably say that the spirit of 
the Dictum requires a ban on both necessary and transcendental connec-
tions between distinct properties. In that case the present view contradicts 
her principle. But someone who is otherwise inclined to accept transcen-
dental facts is not likely to worry that they connect “distinct existences” 
(what else would they connect?). So Hume’s Dictum turns out to be a side 
issue; the big question is whether to accept transcendental facts in the first 
place. 
Not surprisingly, then, the case for moral platonism opens up into the case 
for platonist metaphysics in general. If mathematical, logical, and/or modal 
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facts are best understood as transcendental, then moral platonism has im-
pressive allies. I leave it to others to defend the other platonisms; here I will 
only point out that one can also argue in the other direction. If nonnatural 
realism is the best account of value, and if, as I have argued here, thinking 
about supervenience takes us from nonnatural realism to platonism, then 
one might simply conclude that there are transcendental facts because there 
are values. 
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